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Introduction 
The end of the Cold War era has brought an end to many of the 
conflicts (Ethiopia, Namibia) that disrupted the African 
continent and brought suffering to bo th the warring armies and 
ci v i l ia n popu l ation during th e pa st decade . It has a l so 
f acilitated pc'litical lib eralisation (Zamb i a, Ma li , Gambia . 
Be n in and ~amibia). 
As peaceful and stable situations now seem to settle in many 
African countries previously experien cing conflicts, many 
Governme nts are now undertaking significant economic and 
political changes to transform their soci eties. One such 
change that offers opportunity for governments to reallocate 
resources for the transformation process is demobi lisation of 
soldiers. As conflicts erupted in many African countries, 
armies were incre a sed rapidly and their maintenance claimed 
significant budgetary resources at the expenses of other 
sectors of the economy such as health, education etc. In 
o ther words, mai nt en ance of security became a priority . 
A review of the Uganda demobilisation programme and its 
progress therefore demonstrates that while the war to peace 
transition offers opportunity to recapture substantial 
resources for development, the process presents the same 
transitory social and eco nom ic dev el opme nt probl ems of any 
transformation and adj ustment process. The short experience 
of Uganda with demobilisation offers unique guidance for other 
governments that are intending to demobi lise their armies to 
reallocate resources to set their countries towards the path 
o f peaceful economic and political modernisation. 
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Background and Rationale for Demobilisation 
Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM), came to power in 
1 9 8 6 a f t e r a pro t r a c t e d g u e r r i 1 I a s t rug g 1 e . The pas t two 
decade s of :: i \- i l s t r i [ e h d d 1 e f • L g d n d a w i t h a war- torn an d 
r a va g~d so c ~ al economy. 
From 1986, the National Resistance Army, estimated the n at 
less than 15,000, ~as rapidly expan ded to conta in the 
;nli ti c al a nd military situation :h a cbt ai r.~d i n t~e cc -.;ntry. 
The e x pa n ston be c a me nece ssa ry for the f ollowing reas on s: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i i ) 
The need t o integrate the mi 1 i tary wings of the 
various political organisations which had 
participated i n the war under di ff erent command 
s:ruc t ures as a way of ensuring stability and order 
i n t he country . 
The out b r eak of a lar ge scale r ebe llion in the 
\orth and ~ort h Eastern parts of the co untry in 
1986/87. This necessitated a rap i d mili tary bu i ld 
up in order to app ropria te ly deal with the 
situat i on, and 
The need for the army to participate in the 
maintenance of law an d order after the b reakdown of 
relevant law maintenance organs such as the pol i ce 
force. 
Overtime and by 1992, NRA had successfully overcome the 
rebellion and the Government had been able to re-establish a 
state of increasing secu ri ty, 
towards a path of peaceful 
development. 
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and began to move the countr y 
economic reconstruction and 
.. 
Under these stabi 1 ising condition 
necessary to maintain a large army. 
found it appropriate to reduc e t he 
became 
Government 
army so that 
its focus wo u ld b~ shift~d from the int~nal ~ec u rity p roblems 
to th a t of de fe nding the natio nal borde rs . ~~ducti o n of t he 
ar my a l so me a n t t hat avail a bl e r e so ur ce s for defence wou ld no~ 
be used to im prove army welfare and its quali t y i n equipment 
an d s k ill s . 
The demobilisation of soldiers, esp e cially aft e r re solu t ion of 
t he th e n ob tain i ng mi l i tar y an d po liti cal confli c ts , pro v ide d 
go vernment opportun i ty to s hift the bur d e n of its publ ic 
expend i ture away fr om the earlier necessar y stress on de f enc e 
and s ecur i ty to promoting soc i al and economic developmen t . 
Th i s s h i ft 1n i nves tment from non-produ ctive (destructi ve ) t 
productive assets entail the demobilisation (net rEtducti on ) 
and subsequen t reintegration into productive civilian life of 
about 50,000 soldiers over t hree years. To date and after 
about n i ne month s of programme implementation , about 23.000 
so ld ie r s have been demo b i lis e d. 
The demobilisation of soldiers meant releasing large numbe rs 
o f po tential l y vuln e rable person s and the i r families into a 
relatively hostile labour mar ke t . Ma ny of t he so ldi ers had no 
home s be yo nd NRA , l i tt l e experience of civilian life, no 
savings, little education with no marketable skills. If t he y 
were simply discharged from the military, experience from 
o th er par t s o f Afr ica, a nd wi thin Uganda itself su gg ests tha t 
they could resort t o banditry and o t her form s of u nl a~ful 
beha v iour to provide for th e ms el ves and their fami li es . Such 
a situati on would further burden a weak recovering economy and 
undermine the coun tr y ' s hard-won peace and stability without 
which all development efforts would be futile . 
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Recognising that the demobilised soldie rs woul d constitute a 
"specially disadvantaged group ", the Government decided to 
establish a Veterans Assistance Programme (VAP) to facilitate 
their demobilisation and subsequent reintegration into 
civi li a n e conomy . 
Veterans Assistance Programme (VAP) 
The prima r y object i ve of demobilisation programme was to 
c rca t e a " r e a c e d i \. i d ~ n d '' t ha t co u 1 d be :q :.' p i e d t 0 p r i o r i t y 
eco no mi c s e ct ors . s o ne w soldier s wi l l no t be r ec ru it e d t o 
replace those demobilised. The veterans will not be eligible 
f o r em p 1 o y me n t i n e i t he r co mm e r c i a 1 a c t i v i t i e s run by t he 
mil itar y o r the ci v il service. 
VAP ha s three stages; assembly and discharge, demobilisation 
and reintegration. The first phase, handled by tfie army, 
occurs over a mi nimum of two to three days in centra l assembly 
points in various regions of the country. The second phase of 
demobilisation provides transport and settling-in benefits. 
The final phase , now at a very advanced preparatory stage, 
r e integration, incorporat es the long-term social adjustment, 
training, and employment programmes. The final phase is 
considered cri t i ca l i n sustaining the achie vements made in the 
demobili s ation process. 
The overall objective of the long term package is to ensure 
the smooth re-integration of veterans in t o productive c i v i lian 
li f e wit h t he f o ll owin g spe c ific obj ecti ves: 
(i) to provide the modalities for counse 11 ing on job 
opportunities, health, education and on economic 
activities; 
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( i i ) to for assisting the veterans 
in job 
( i i i ) to assess po ssibi l . t,ies and suggest wa ys and 
> 
me a n s f o r · '8t l 1 t a t .. i n g ~ - · ~ 1. ·, 
continue with ~ ~·,._ 
interested veterans t o 
and to assist 
product ive activities through provision of credit. 
With the demobilisation of 2.3. 0 00 soldiers now complete, it 1s 
an ' i c i p ..i ~ r: d : h a t . :-.-= t h r us ~ 0 " t he pro g r ~ mm e . ( i n add i t i on : 2 
fu rt her demobi 1 isat ion) wi 11 be re-i ntegr ation. The s ucce ss of 
the reintegr ation process does not only co nsolidat e the 
transition from war to peace but guarantee s that thos e 
citizens directly involved in the resoluti on of conflicts are 
settled as productive member s o f communities. 
As a first step in creat i ng the programme, extensive 
preparatory work was undertaken to determine persona l 
characteristics and post demobilisation aspirations of the 
militar y personnel, the admin istrative structure required and 
the structure and cost of s hort and longer-term reintegratio n 
programmes. Guidelines to be used in selecting the personnel 
to be demobilised were drawn and agreed on by the Army council 
and the se included volunt ary resignation, age, service no 
longer requi red and health. 
Settling in Kit: 
Pr ovision of en t i t l e men t s to veterans wa s carefully 
considered. the objective of the se ttl ing-i n-k it was t o 
ensure the quick resettlement of the veterans as civilians by 
providing them with the means to meet their immediate needs 
during the first six months of his/her resettlement. The 
programme covered the veteran and his immediate family who 
were considered a "vulnerable social unit", thus increasing 
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beneficiaries to over 70 . 00 0. It was anticipated that 
payment of settling in kit that takes into account the veteran 
and his immedi a te family would smooth ou t t he t ransition to 
civ i lian life and communit y reintegration. Entitlements 
(clothing . food, shelter. medicare and school fees for two 
children) were pr ovided to veterans and spr ead over time ( six 
months) and location (discharge point and d istrict), thereby 
spreading the social costs o f reint egr at i on among a s many 
communities as pos sible . 
I t was also intended to encou rage vet erans to f ind employment 
in thei r areas of settlement. r ather t han congregating 1n 
Kampala or other urban centres and reduci ng the ris k o f lar g e 
groups of former soldiers di sru pting law an d order. Payment of 
benefit s was also spread over time and locati on to ensure that 
th e y will be availab l e when required and used as intended. as 
well as encou r age veter an s to settle in rural are as .• 
Institutional Arrangement 
An e x tensive programme of this natur e re quir e s an appropriate 
institutional framework to expe di t e its i mplementa tion . 
Accordingly. Governme nt legally c on s t it uted the Uganda Ve t eran 
Assistance Board to implement the Pro g ramme. A Board of 
Direct or s i s responsible for policy decisions and gene ral 
supervision of the programme. At operational l e vel . the Board 
was managed by Secretariat and each distri ct had a s ta ff of 
three persons to handle all matte r s pert a i ning t o d emob ilised 
so ldie rs . At the District level a District Veterans' 
Committee o\· ersees the implementation process by the fie ld 
officers. 
In addition, the prog ramme was s uppo rt ed t hrough prov is ion o f 
technical assistance and several consult an ci e s wh i ch pro vid ed 
technical expertise f or t he prog r amme implementation . 
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Experiences and Lessons from the Programme. 
Like all other adjustment programmes, demobilisation of 
soldiers presents same transitory social and economic 
development pro ble ms. With no parallels 1n Africa. 
demobilising large numbers of soldiers requires a stro ng an d 
bold political commit ment. It also means that oversized 
armies, which some governments in Africa used to cling to 
power and suppress op position, are no longer necessary a s 
conflicts c e ase. r~~tead . we s hould evolve peaceful politi ca l 
processes to resolve ou r conflict s . The demobilisation 
experiment in Cganda clearly demonstrates the political 
commitment of Go vernment towards demobilisation, and a desire 
to evolve peaceful political pro cesses for change. I wish 
also to observe that the armies which are due to undergo a 
reduction-in-force also need carefu l sensitisation and 
cooperation in the demobilisation exercise. 
Given budgetary constraints often experienced during 
adjustment programmes, the role of the donor community is 
part ic ularly crucial in demobilisation exercise. In the 
context of Uganda, the cost of undertaking significant 
demobilisa tion to realise sizable "peace dividend" implied 
availability of resources to effect payment of benefits to 
demobil ised soldiers to facil itate their transition from 
military to civilian life. The strong political commitment on 
the part of Government to the exercise received positive 
response from the donor community which generously provided 
significant financial resou rces for the implementation of the 
pr ogramme. The se cost s of the progra mme wi 11, in course of 
time, pay off through savings, which can then be reallocated 
to other priority areas such as health and education which 
suffered at a time when defence expenditures of necessity 
claimed significant budgetary resources. 
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Equally important 1n demobi 1 is at ion is the need to have an 1n 
depth knowledge of socio-economic characteristics of 
demobilised soldiers as these influence transition and 
s ubsequent integration processes. These characteristics also 
provide sound basis for the design of appropr1ate programmes 
for r eintegratio n. In th~ context of Uganda, the majo rity of 
ve t e rans were young in age bracket of 20 - JO implying the 
need for a medium to long-term programme of assistance to 
harness this important section of t he country's workf orc e. 
~ 0 ~eo~er . mo st o~ these yo uths had lit tle or nc educa t ion an d 
lack marketable s k i lls. This came about as a re su l t of these 
ga l lant s on s a nd daughters of Uga nda opting to fight for rea l 
freedom to continuing with their education. This exacerbated 
the vulnerability o f the veterans. 
Some vetera ns discharged on medical grounds were "causalit y 
cases" and these constitute a particularly vulnerable group 
which is likely to complicate the process of reintegration. 
Some veterans, in the casualty group were receiving treatment 
while in the army, found themselves unable to meet med i cal 
bills after demobilisation. Accordingly, the needs of this 
subset and others emerge more significantly than the rest of 
demobilised soldiers during implementation of the programme. 
Fortunately, the majority of these cases are now placed i n a 
special category for whom a special discharge and re-
integration programme is being worked out. Thanks to the far 
sightedness of the army leadership. 
The l evel and effectivenes s of org ani sation of i mplementor s is 
cri tical towa rds succes sful demobilisa tion. :\t th e vario us 
districts where soldiers settled, personnel to specifically 
and expeditiously attend to the issues related to 
demobilisation were in place. Moreover, the programmes utilised 
expertise of Consult ants to undertake in depth monitoring, 
evaluation and beneficiary assessment of various aspects of 
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the programme. Lessons and experiences learnt from programme 
monitoring and evaluat i on were directly feedback towards 
improving the implementation process as well as providing 
basis of designing sub sequent phases of demobilisation. 
While the first pha se of demobilisation of sol d iers i n lganda 
has offered opportunity for Government to reduce defe nc e 
expenditure and subsequently to be used in other priority 
sectors and programmes including decentra lisatio n, it s 
sustendnce and dcc ep:a~ce will der end n the r ei n:e gra ti o n 
p ro gramme s to fur ther assist the demobilised soldiers sett l e 
in to civilian life by enhancing their productive capacity. 
Initial fears of disruption of peac e and stability appear to 
hold many Governments ba ck from taking dec i sions towards 
de mo bilis ation. This inertia ma y be remo ved thr ough effective 
counselling proces s of would be veterans, effective r handling 
of all unlawful acts of those demobilised as we ll as putting 
in place programme for their further integration into civilian 
communities. It also entails evolution of polit ic al processes 
that encourage and support peaceful resolution of conf lic ts in 
society without mili tary resource that seems to support 
maintenance of oversized armies. For demobilisation 
ex per i ments of this nature to hold the promise of providing 
additional resources f or development, the 
it must be firml y dealt wit h like 
p rogr ammes. 
issues arising f rom 
i n all adjustment 
It should also be understood tha t , the p rolonged military 
conflicts in Afri ca all seem t o have t ired out mil it a ry 
personnel to the extent of many desiring to settle civilian 
life . With proper guidance and appropriate political changes, 
reduction of armies in Africa indeed offer opportunity for all 
to reap peace dividends and encourage the citizen towards 
determination of their destinies with minimal use of military 
recourse. 
9 
Our humble observation demobilisation demonstrates that 
reduct ion of armies through demob i 1 isat ion wi 11 have the 
greatest impact, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
bulk of military expenditure is not on weapons but on 
personnel. 
The l'gan dan experience s ugge sts that with careful planning, it 
i s possible for African Governments to demobilise oversized 
arm1es without social disruptions and without underm1ning 
s e :.:Jr~:y. : l : t .1 r :: e . ~ i=' end i t . r e (. . r 
c on t ribu te signi f i cantly to social e;,: pend i ture s of genera l 
ben~fi t. Reduction in force also de monstrat es our resolve to 
opt for pea c eful self governance . Finally, it offers 
op portunity to transform the vulnerable ar my personne l 
in volv ed i n these conflicts into prod uctive section of society 
contributing to overall development process. 
Finally, I woul d like to underline the fact that we in Uganda 
associated with the on-going demobi li sation exercise do not 
claim so much experience and expertise. We have made our own 
mis ta kes and are learning from it. ~e would like to exchange 
views and experience with our counter parts especially in 
Africa to enhance our knowledge and deepen our insight into a 
programme which offers strategic gains for our Governments and 
peoples. 
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